The game-theoretic approach to estimating the equitable value of intellectual property rights in the university-startup licensing agreements

This paper examines the mechanisms of mutually beneficial partnership between a university and a technology startup, including fair terms for transferring to the startup intellectual property rights (IPR) created within the university. The current situation in Russia is analyzed using the terminology of new institutional economics. As a tool of institution-al modeling, the study employs a game-theoretic approach in which the interaction be-tween the university and the technology startup is represented as a finite dynamic non-zero-sum two-player game. The model takes into account such factors as the university’s participation in the startup’s authorized capital and the startup’s potential interest in «bypassing» the university’s intellectual property if the transaction price is overstated. It is proposed that the equitable value be assessed on the basis of market value, by analogy with the well-known and widely used collateral value assessment methodology, followed by an adjustment reflecting the specific terms of the transaction between the particular participants, namely the university and the startup. The developed approach to assessing the equitable value of intellectual property rights (IPR) can be interpreted as an institutional complement, that is, an instrument that enhances the effectiveness of the existing rules and norms governing interaction between universities and technology startups.

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