

PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, SOCIOLOGY

UNDERSTANDING AS REALISATION OF LANGUAGE GAME

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The strategy under analysis represents the problem of understanding as the question of circumstances under which we have the right to say that we understand something. In this case understanding is identified with the participating in some language game. This strategy does not require (and even does not let) turning to the notion of “transcendental condition” for understanding someone’s behavior or some language game.

The problem of understanding is not the central one in analytical philosophy, and a lot of representatives of this school do not touch upon this question in their research. Nevertheless you can discover unity in the ways of understanding this problem which allows singling out two main strategies of its decision among analysts: understanding as the participating in language game and understanding as description. The strategies are not alternative and can be both found in the works of one thinker (during the same period) applied to different problems.

The basis for such approach to the language was founded by L. Wittgenstein in the late period of his works. Realizing the understanding as the ability to act rightly within the definite language game occurred in analytical philosophy because of several reasons. As the main one, the rejection of the view on language system as independent essence can be singled out. Accepting of dependence of the system on language activity that possess social character brings forth another answer to the question concerning understanding the language: “Language game” is also the name for the whole unity: language and activities connected to it¹. To define the *idea of language game* Wittgenstein sometimes compared it to a theatre performance where “stage”, “acts”, “actions”, “roles”, certain “scenes”, “words”, “gestures” (“moves” in games) are all connected together: “Games are examples of speech practice, unity of *thought-word-action*, and also of *circumstances under which all these are “working”*”². Wittgenstein explains “language games” as “forms of language, with the help of which the child

begins to learn the usage of certain words”³. The research of language games he determines as the research of the primitive forms of the language: “If we want to study the problems of truth and lie, coordination and non-coordination of statements and reality, problems of the nature of a statement, exclamation and question, we will carefully watch the primitive forms of speech activity, where these forms of thinking occur per se not connected with complicated processes of thinking. When we watch such simple forms of language, the mental fog covering common usage of language disappears. We see activities and reactions which are obvious and distinct. On the other hand, in these processes we see the forms of language not separated by complicated differentiations. We see we can build complicated forms out of simple ones by increasing new forms”⁴.

The language game between the bricklayer and the apprentice described by him has become hackneyed illustration to the approach under research. During the game the statements “Beam!”, “Plate!” are used not as the description of the state of the activities but as the orders of the bricklayer “Give the plate” or “Bring the beam”. Understanding of these orders by the apprentice is his ability to fulfill the orders rightly⁵.

Let’s turn to the reasoning of understanding the language as an activity. The problem of teaching language is in its basis. It occurs that teaching the meaning of the word is not realized by showing an object and naming it, as sometimes it is impossible (for example the explanation of words “right” or “wrong”). Ex-

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plaining the word with the help of other words is not successful either, as the chain of explanatory words can become endless. Teaching is realized by practicing and using the word.

To describe the functioning of words and our activities when using them Wittgenstein introduces the idea of language game. The term "language game" can be understood in two ways: as a simple model for explaining elementary forms of human communication and as "form of life": "To think of some language means to think of some form of life"⁶. Using the expression "form of life", Wittgenstein tried to emphasize that every person possesses some language and thus human beings coordinate with each other. In other words the philosopher just states the fact towards "the human nature". Using the language, participating in language games are the main features for Wittgenstein that make people different from animals. Language game as "form of life" means the combination of using the words with other kinds of practice⁷. Using the sign refers neither to the mental shape of the object, nor to the concrete object of real world.

So, the state concerning the language as form of life means that sentences act like actions. They act passing by reflection and mental processes. That's why the provocative questions occur: "What do you do or feel when you say, what you are thinking of?". The thing is that Wittgenstein shows a simple language game on the basis of which we think of correlation between sign and meaning. We understand the sign as material and meaning as ideal. Sometimes their difference is the correlation of formal (sign) and substantial (conceptual) aspects of a language. In any case it is supposed that the meaning of the sign "revives" because of special mental procedure, which is called differently: "thinking", "capturing", "interpreting" and so on. Person as "symbolic animal" thinks all the time, he reflects, doubts. Using and understanding the sign depend on rules of concrete language game, into which individuals are involved. "Nevertheless we do not consider language games described as some incomplete parts of the language, but as the languages being complete systems of human communication"⁸, - says Wittgenstein. Pragmatic notion of "language game" needs neither representation of the subject, nor the presence of the object which traditionally composed meaning. Meanings in the language do not consist of the subject but represent the result of objective

system of rules working in definite context. For Wittgenstein understanding this or that situation depends on following the rules of the language game. These rules are local grammar or logic. This grammar or logic is not mathematically counted but it bounds doubts and questions which are bounded by language game⁹.

The statement of Wittgenstein concerning the fact that awareness of the meaning of the expression comes to the awareness of its usage (ability to use the sign right) is the central thesis of linguistic philosophy. This thesis later was developed in the research works of Oxford representatives of common language school (J. Austin, G. Rile, P. Strauson). The founder of the theory of speech acts, John Austin, shows that language does not come to descriptive statements. It consists mostly of performatives. Austin writes: "Philosophers were sure for a long time that "statement" can only "describe" the state of things or "can state something concerning some fact" which must be either true or wrong"¹⁰. In fact speech can contain such usage of words which does not describe anything: "using such sentences are parts of actions which are not described as talking about anything"¹¹. In such cases to use the sentence under certain circumstances means to effect the action. Such usage is called performative.

However, if effecting the actions is the aim of the use, it does not mean that the action can be effected with the help of the words only. We must remember that constatives and performatives are not the constituents of two classes of different statements; the same phrase can be used subject to circumstances either as constative or as performative. Success or non-success of effecting the action by using some word constructions depends on how much such usage corresponds to the whole context (language game). So it is necessary for the circumstances under which the words are used were corresponding, "and usually it is necessary, - says Austin, - for a speaker and other participants of the speech act also effect other actions: either "physical" or "mental" activities or pronouncing other words"¹². There must be "...certain conventional procedure that has certain conventional effect and this procedure must include the usage of certain words under certain circumstances..."¹³. Thus, rightness of this or that usage of words (its understanding) is determined by the correspondence of this usage to the rules of the language game.

The intention to issue from language usage assumes the immunity to various "linguistic

mystifications". Gilbert Rile thinks that decision of paradoxes of the wrong usage of the language is the main problem of philosophy. The results of its activity should be indicating the bounds of using "pure" concepts, methodological understanding and checking of their adequate usage. Using Rile's terminology we can say that one of the words that usually mislead us is the word "thinking". According to a wide-spread opinion, certain word stands for some secret psychological process or experience. However, according to the philosophers of the strategy in question it is better to speak about lots of processes showing thinking.

So, Wittgenstein drew attention to the fact that words corresponding to "mental dictionary" can mean not the inner experience but the outer fixed behavior. This explains the following statement of the philosopher: "Following the rule I do not choose. I follow the rule *blindly*"¹⁴. To our opinion, this statement should be interpreted through argumentation against the conception of interpretation as a process lying in the basis of word (sentence) understanding. According to a wide-spread opinion, language expressions do not "say" anything until they are interpreted. Interpretation is a special type of private mental experience. It is supposed that mental processes make necessary addition to functioning of the language; they "bring signs to life". Understanding a language as an activity, otherwise, assumes that the language speaks itself. When we think verbally, "meanings" do not occur in our mind together with speech expressions; otherwise, "language itself is the carrier of the thought"¹⁵. The founder of the strategy in question characterizes the above-mentioned opinion concerning meaning: "The mistake we make, - says Wittgenstein, - can be expressed in such a way: we search for a sign usage, but we search for it as it was an object co-existing with the sign. (One of the causes of this mistake consists in the fact that we are looking for "an object, corresponding to a noun")"¹⁶. Regular mistakes of this kind occur because of an opinion concerning the presence of two languages — mental and verbal. Argumentation of the representatives of the strategy is simple. For the disproof, the following mental experiment is suggested: "...we shall say (and think of) the sentence, for example: "It seems to rain tomorrow". Now we think of it without pronouncing. If a thought about tomorrow rain is accompanied by pronouncing the words about

tomorrow rain, then we just do the first exercise and leave the second. If the thinking and speaking correspond to each other as the words and the tune of the song, then we can drop away the words and think just like we sing a tune without words"¹⁷. As we found out it is impossible.

Gilbert Rile develops Wittgenstein's argumentation against identification of understanding with some kind of mental activity. Acting against groundless intellectualization of mind activities, British analyst considers understanding as the ability to effect certain operations within the concrete "form of life" being the basis for any knowledge. Rile distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge: "knowing how" and "knowing what". The first kind contains adopted aptitudes to some behavior, skills to "disposition". The second kind is the theoretical knowledge itself. The main thesis of the philosopher consists in the fact that "there are a lot of kinds of activity which reveal features of mind and which are neither intellectual operations, nor their consequences. Intellectual practice is not the stepdaughter of the theory. On the contrary, theorizing is one of practices together with others and can be effected rightly or wrongly"¹⁸. To Rile's opinion exactly "knowing how" is lying in the basis of intellectual operations, but not the other way round: "Knowing how to use maxims can not be reduced down to accepting these or those maxims, it also is not concluded from them"¹⁹. Understanding is the part of "knowing how", but not the part in the sense of kind of this knowledge. It accompanies "knowing how", without being special spiritual process. We remind that according to Rile, behavior — is not the key to the mind work, but the work of mind itself. So, understanding is a kind of behavior and therefore is subject to outer observation and description. Understanding means possessing verified competence in some area. Thus, we can say that somebody understands how to play chess if we see that he plays it rightly or judges rightly towards someone's game. But for our understanding behavior of other person our "knowing how", our competence in this kind of activity is required. Even when we say in common speech that somebody understands Platon's philosophy we mean that this someone is able to "estimate the power, direction or the cause of philosophic argument" and, therefore, "knows how to make part out of that he knew how to do Platon himself"²⁰. However our competence can not be as high as the one of activity executor's. As under-

standing is inseparable part of “knowing how” it also can be partial. Achieving of full understanding requires full mastering of the ways of activities for understanding that is only possible by practice. The idea of non-understanding does not cause theoretical difficulties among representatives of the strategy in question. Involvement into a certain game is important: only a person who knows how to play the game, the rules of the game can estimate the actions of the player wrongly. Rile`s example is demonstrative: “Tactics of the card player is always interpreted wrongly by his rivals, so some manoeuvre they think they have recognized is possibly a special manoeuvre of the game, and not the one chosen by the player. Only the one who knows the rules of the game is able to interpret his game as the carrying out of the mentioned manoeuvre. Non-understanding is a collateral result of knowing how. Even a person who speaks Russian, can interpret Russian phrase wrongly. Mistakes are the realizations of skills”²¹.

So, understanding is an ability to act rightly in language game. “Rightly” means here “according to rules”. A pupil not just imitates the teacher but learns to get new information on the basis of rules and he also must understand which continuations of rules usage are right and which are wrong. On this basis hermeneutics insists on the synthesis of reflection and traditions. Pure ideas themselves do not provide activities (Hamlet`s situation). But besides “volitional resolution”, skills and tradition is necessary. P. Winch in his popular work “Idea of social science” indicates that Wittgenstein`s term “training” for the process of teaching a language does not come to animal acts. In fact, in some examples he shows the difference of training a parrot and teaching a child. However this difference does not consist in “proof” and the fact that a person acts on the basis of understanding meaning or preliminary search of truth. In everyday life people do not search for basis, they follow the rules. Their difference consists in the fact that they can apply rules for the new cases and act according to the formula “and so on”. A good example is a continuation of natural numbers. “Rule” itself Wittgenstein understands not as a “formula”, but as a procedure of repetition of “the same” for the new situation. The behavior of a trained dog which eats sugar only after the command of the master, looks like rule-following one though it has not got call of duty. The behavior is conditioned by Pavlov who described the mechanism of conditional reflex. Hu-

man behavior is characterized not by mechanic, but by a sensible use of rules. But this “reasonableness” is not reflection, but the ability to repeat, i.e. use the rule for the new situations. The difference between “conditional reflex” and “rule” is the fact that the later assumes mistake.

Here we should mention that the indicated rules are some regularities of the use of definite words according to definite circumstances. Rules are not transcendental basis of existing of concrete language game; they exist because individuals create this regularity. That`s why “Is the fact that we call “following the rule” something that can be effected only by one person and only once in his life?” is, of course, a remark about grammar of the expression “following the rule”. It is impossible for a rule to be followed only by one person and only once. It is impossible for an announcement to be said only once, for a task to be given or understood only once and so on. To follow a rule, to make an announcement, to give the task, to play chess – all these are *practices* (institutes)”²². Following the rule or the right usage of some expression is possible only within the general language game. “To understand a sentence, - says Wittgenstein, - means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be able to use some technique”²³.

With the problem of rule-following actions Wittgenstein`s paradox is connected: “...no course of action can be defined by some rule, as any course of action can be corresponded to this rule. The answer is: if everything can be corresponded to the rule given, then everything can be drawn to the opposition with this rule. That`s why there was neither correspondence, nor opposition”²⁴. On one hand, paradox of following a rule reveals impossibility of existing of the personal language for describing self inner feelings (as outer observer won`t be able to define if the person follows or breaks the rules, and the person himself won`t be able to find the mistake, as the instances of control and execution coincide). On the other hand to our opinion, this paradox shows invalidation of understanding rules existing independently from language games and determining lots of their usages. As it was mentioned before, rules, according to Wittgenstein, are not ideal essences, but a conditional name for regularity of the use of definite words under definite circumstances. “And this testifies that there is such understanding of the

rule which is not an interpretation. It can be found in what we call “following the rule” and “acting in spite of” the rule in real circumstances of its usage”²⁵. Wittgenstein does not give the answer to the question about conditions of possibility of “reproduction” of rules. Evidently, the question itself within his conception is not correct, as we are not able to realize conditions of possibility of language game being involved into it.

In analytical philosophy various interpretations of Wittgenstein’s paradox can be found, they are different from the one above. One of them is really worth mentioning, as it is opposite to the statements on which the strategy in question is based. We mean interpretation of skeptical paradox, suggested by S.A. Kripke who wrote a book “Wittgenstein about Rules and Individual Language”. Kripke believes that the rightness of the usage of words can be defined only with the help of social practice. He introduces the figure of Skeptic who says that an individual never knows whether he really follows the rules. Skeptic doubts that somebody adding 68 to 57 really effects the operation of summing up and not “cemming”. The answer of the person it that he is effecting the operation according to the rule of summing, Skeptic says that his opponent used counting only to the final number of cases in the past and he can not be sure that he is following the same rule now. “So, - says Kripke, - skeptic doubts about my today’s interpretation of my past definition of the use of the word “counting”, as he already did with the notion “plus””²⁶.

To prove the rightness of our interpretation of rules we shall have to introduce rules on their interpretation, then – rules on interpretation of rules, rules on interpretation of rules, and so on. Inner feelings towards operation of summing is also not the criterion for its right carrying out: “...there are not any “conditions of truth” or “corresponded facts” in the world, which make the statement true, as “Johns like most of us takes “+” as summing”. We’d better look at how such statements are used...”²⁷. Feelings and emotions of Johns do not result in his right effecting. According to the American analyst, “heart” of skeptical paradox consists in the fact that in the end we reach the level on which we act without any reason, making “jump into the darkness”. It gives reason for comparing Wittgenstein with Hume who stated that we do not have any grounds to see causal connection between the facts that sun rose in the east and it has risen in the east today.

According to this interpretation the only excuse for our behavior is its correspondence to “agreement” adopted in society where “every person who says that he follows the rule can be controlled by other people”²⁸. Indicating that following the rule is social practice during which “tastelike” answers are not allowed, to our opinion, adds nothing except new unclearness to skeptical paradox of Wittgenstein. So it is not clear what social agreement on word usage really means: is it just a metaphor or Kripke really thinks that someone decides how to use the word “mamma”?). By the way it is not clear how rules exist in society, and what makes their changes possible. The statement “society states the rightness of our actions” becomes tautological as society itself is a form of life which is determined by Kripke as “lots of answers with the help of which we coordinate with each other and with the help of which they interlace with our actions”²⁹. In this case the statement above can be reformulated in such away: Our rule-following activity states the rightness of “our actions”. We should mention that interpretation of Wittgenstein’s paradox by Kripke has the danger of hypostasis of rules of language games as the result of acceptance the society as “guaranty” of the rightness of language usage.

Such hypostasis makes K.O. Apel. He suggests that transition from considering the intentions of text authors, their subjective ideas and feelings to the analysis of the meaning of the text itself, from one hand, and interest of analysts to “semantics and pragmatics of natural language” on the other, can become the basis for unity of analytical and hermeneutic philosophy. Such unity, to the opinion of German philosopher, can be effected on position of “transcendental pragmatism”.

Consideration of late Wittgenstein’s philosophy by Apel (Apel in the first place starts on his ideas concerning perspectives of analytical philosophy) is not perfect. His claim towards analysts not to clear out problem of meaning and understanding could not extract all the transcendental implications out of his theory, it is groundless. Of course, Wittgenstein did not suggest transcendental decisions. It seems wrong to us to characterize his latest studies as transcendental semantics. In order to clear up the situation it is necessary to follow the evolution of the philosopher’s ideas.

In the late period of his works Wittgenstein changed most regulations of “Logical Philosophic

Treatise". Particularly he objected the principle of logical independence of elementary propositions which was stated in "Logical Philosophic Treatise": "5.135 The existence of one situation does not mean the existence of the other different situation. 5.136 There is no casual relationship to excuse such conclusion. 5.1361 It is impossible to make future prediction on the basis of the present"³⁰. The reasons for such rejection are the statements about the presence of one situation result in the presence of the other. For example, when we say our real age (let it be 15), we can suggest that we are neither 5 nor 55. Wittgenstein concludes that estimating some situation we measure it in accordance with not only one proposition but with the whole system of language (Satzsystem). Moritz Shlick tried to clear up the status Satzsystem (if it is a priori or a posteriori, if it introduces into philosophy syntactical a priori). That's why a mental experiment was suggested "a person in a red room". Shlick asks Wittgenstein: "You say that colors form system. Is there anything logical or empiric? What will happen if somebody lives in red room all his life? Or if anybody sees only red? Can he say that he sees only red?"³¹. Wittgenstein's answer is: "Here are only two possibilities: a) his syntax is like ours: red, redder, light-red, orange and so on. Then he has our system of colors; or b) his syntax is not like ours. Then he does not know the colors the way we do. As far as the sign has one and the same meaning, it must have one and the same syntax. It depends neither on number of visible colors, nor on syntax. (It also does not depend on "amount of space"³².) Wittgenstein indicates that Shlick's question is wrong and the answer corrects the mistake of red room.

We can say that introducing "rule" by Apel is "red room fallacy", as Stuart Shenker indicates³³. Mentioned mistake is the fact that philosophic, logical question "How is our understanding or interpretation build?" is exchanged by the psychological question "How can anybody learn the system of rules necessary to understand or interpret something?". Shenker characterizes this problem: "The matter of hermeneutic problem is an attempt to represent philosophic decision of the question how we can be sure what a red room person means. The answer of Wittgenstein: "the matter is how we use the notions", and that's all"³⁴. Wittgenstein's reasoning is quite simple: either we have the same syntax and we understand each other, or syntax is different and we do not understand each other.

Showing impossibility of suggested by Apel "symbiosis" of analytical and phenomenon-hermeneutic traditions on the transcendental basis, Shenker notifies that modern hermeneutic philosophy is extremely busy searching answer to the question about how we can be sure that we really understand somebody or something. To ask a question in such a way means to make a "red room fallacy". The question "how can we really understand something?" makes us suggest the existence of some "deep" models. It results in searching concealed basis (it can be transcendental conditions of communication, society and so on), implicit conditions determining our activities. Such a way makes us create theoretical model giving real knowledge of criteria with the help of which it will be possible to define if somebody acts rightly or wrongly, as well as we when we try to understand something and is the reached understanding right.

The problem of understanding in the researched strategy is the question of circumstances under which we have the right to say that we understand something (for example, another language game or some speech). Understanding in this case is associated with participating in some language game. The decision of problem of understanding consists in following. When we are within the language game our ability to take part in it is the understanding of the game. It assumes mutual understanding between players. If the two talking men are involved into one language game they understand each other as they own language systems with the same syntax. The question "do I really understand the person I am talking to?" is not correct here. In other case, it is unclear what else the word "understand" can mean; besides we are capable for joint actions (in this case, for a discussion). Misunderstanding in this case is treatable and is not a problem (not philosophic one, surely).

Turning to a language game or tradition it is not necessary to ask questions "How we can understand something?", "Do we really understand how really we should understand?". If we do not understand we enter another language game, which sets connection with the subject or object. This language game does not ask turning to something except their rules which we follow. It is useless to speak about "mutual understanding" of traditions (indicated traditions must coincide in such case, be one and the tradition), we can speak only about participating of their representatives in the general language game.

Rules of the language game exist beforehand for those who enter the game. In addition when the game was created there were no ready rules described, process of the game and creating of rules were simultaneous. Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of channel and stream. He tries to get away from the question about priority. For example, he wrote that “fundamental” notions must not be precise. This their “blur” opens possibility of variation of the game and using rules in new conditions. Thanks to this concrete usage they are specified. Wittgenstein mentioned that “language game changes through time” but he did not show how it happens. More exactly he ran upon the cruelty of rules though he looked for “open sign systems”. In his examples different language games are incommensurate: if educated atheists came to the church and began to doubt that wine and bread are blood and body of God, they would be eliminated from the church. Wittgenstein models endless number of various forms of doubt and speaks about the fact that dissident people are not objected but are called strange.

However, such strategy does not allow attracting notion “transcendental condition” for understanding of somebody’s behavior or some language game. “Sensible” and effective can be the language game, which brings practical use. Understanding language game as practice and institute, as form of life, Wittgenstein does not speak only about primitive people and children games which are really very important. We can speak about the whole hierarchy, constantly getting complicated system of games, cause even animals use signs, but only people gives them meaning and acts reasonably. Wittgenstein did not become “a new archaic” and he did not object “high games”. His suggestion was to clear up their genealogy and to open their practical sense. The game with notion should not be “beads game”, but “a form of life”. It is another case when the concept of practice is not enough reasonable. Here also the principle of “family likeness” works.

¹ Wittgenstein L. *Philosophic Researches* // Wittgenstein L. *Philosophic Works*. P. I. M., 1994. P. 83.

² Quot: Kozlova M.S. Idea of “language games” // *Philosophic ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein*. M., 1996. P. 12.

³ Wittgenstein L. *The Blue Book*. M., 1999. P. 32.

⁴ There. P. 33.

⁵ Wittgenstein L. *Philosophic Researches*. P. 81.

⁶ There. P. 86.

⁷ No doubt there is influence on world-view of Wittgenstein by social interaction, pragmatics, pedagogic science and anthropology. May be it will help to understand the meaning which he implied in the phrase “Language is a form of life”. No doubt its kernel is defined by cultural anthropological, pedagogical and psychiatric aspects. Language expressions are put by Wittgenstein into dependence on behavior in concrete situations: one and the same word in different contexts gets different meaning. Philosopher does not accept “pure sense”, expressed by metaphysical notions and speaks about “family likeness”, or about “families” of meanings of words and expressions.

⁸ Wittgenstein L. *The Brown Book*. M., 1999. P. 11.

⁹ This idea is used by Wittgenstein to criticize philosophic questions that occur from doubt of Descartes type – doubt which ignores language game boundaries and tries to rise above common language. This Descartes doubt continues to exist both in phenomenon reduction of E. Gusserle and in the works of representatives of existentialism who explain the world of common language as obstacle on the way to express a subject and his real relation with The Other.

¹⁰ Austin J. *How to act with Help of Words?* // Austin J. *Selected Works*. M., 1999. P. 15.

¹¹ There. P. 18.

¹² There. P. 20-21.

¹³ There. P. 26.

¹⁴ Wittgenstein L. *Philosophic Researches*. P. 167.

¹⁵ There. P. 190.

¹⁶ Wittgenstein L. *The Blue Book*. M., 1999. P. 14.

¹⁷ There. P. 74-75.

¹⁸ Rile G. *The Notion of Mind*. M., 1999. P. 35.

¹⁹ There. P. 40.

²⁰ There. P. 63.

²¹ There. P. 67-68.

²² Wittgenstein L. *Philosophic Researches*. P. 162.

²³ There.

²⁴ There. P. 163.

²⁵ There.

²⁶ Kripke S.A. Wittgenstein about Rules and Individual Language // *Logos*. 1999. № 1 (11). P. 159.

²⁷ There. P. 177.

²⁸ There. P. 183.

²⁹ There. P. 182.

³⁰ Wittgenstein L. *Logic Philosophic Treatise* // Wittgenstein L. *Philosophic Researches*. P. 1. M., 1994. P. 38.

³¹ Waisman F. Wittgenstein and Vienna Society // *Analytical Philosophy: Formation and Development* (Anthology). M., 1998. P. 52.

³² There. P. 52-53.

³³ Shanker S.G. Wittgenstein’s Solution of “Hermeneutic Problem” // *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*. L., 1988. V. IV.

³⁴ There. P. 114.