A game-theoretical model for conducting a public discussion of the legal regulation of entrepreneurship
Abstract. In the Russian practice of state regulation, institutions of involving economic agents in as-sessingthe effectiveness of policies, analyzing and adjustingthe regulatory environment are taking root. However, low efficiency of such tools for the purpose of reducing administrative costs and weak involvement of stakeholders in public management processes are noted. This actualizes the need to model public discussion procedures with the development of approaches to improving communications between government and business. The purpose of the article is to build a model of public consultations that provides the ability to adjust individual parameters in the practice of public administration to improve the efficiency of assessing the regulatory impact as an institution for making collective management decisions. The key research methods are institutional analysis, game-theoretic approach, and sociological survey. The features of domestic institutions for making collective decisions in public administration are analyzed. Based on game theory, a model of public consultations on draft legal acts with the civil community is built. In the game matrix, gains are presented as the difference between direct benefits and costs, taking into account lost opportunities for two players - the state and the entrepreneur (association). A condition has been found under which partnership relations are an equilibrium in dominant strategies for both parties. The results are supplemented by data from a survey of civil servants and entrepreneurs regarding their ideas about the institution of assessing legal acts. The author`s developments provide the possibility of adjusting individual parameters in public administration practice to improve the effectiveness of assessing regulatory impact as an institution for making collective management decisions.
Keywords: regulatory impact assessment, collective decisions, collective regulation, co-regulation, lean regulation, business and government communications, public discussions, game theory, game-theoretic model.
Highlights:
- the game-theoretic model of public consultations with the business community leads to 4 possible outcomes of interaction: state dominance, informal lobbying, inertia option and partnerships; there is a condition under which the "partnership" will be an equilibrium in the dominant strategies;
- all groups of participants of the regulatory impact assessment have a skeptical or optimistic attitude towards the effectiveness of this institution as a tool to reduce the administrative burden and as a mechanism for balancing the interests of the parties;
- the problem of the principal agent remains relevant in regulatory impact assessment. It defines key tasks in the medium term: transformation of officials` relations to the institute, increasing the involvement of top officials in improving the regulatory environment, increasing the degree of consideration of the positions of participants in public consultations and conclusions of assessment conclusions, reducing the asymmetry of access to information to ensure an evidence-based approach the sides of the business.
Irina I. Rakhmeeva, Dmitry V. Filatov, Mikhail Yu. Andronov - Ural State University of Economics, Yekaterinburg, Russia