DEFINITION ISSUES OF REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE OLIGOPOLY MARKET
The article represents the issues defining equilibrium in the oligopoly market in terms of the asymmetry awareness with Stackelberg leader (leaders) taking into account the reflexive behavior of market agents with coincidence of ranks reflection. The relevance of the study is defined, firstly, by the significant role of the oligopoly in the global energy market; secondly, by the significant influence of the reflexive behavior of market agents on the emerging balance. The objectives of the study are the development of game-theoretic models of the oligopoly market based on reflection and development of mechanisms to establish equilibrium taking into account different reflexive ideas of agents. The study is based on the methods of economic-mathematical modeling, optimization method, methods of game theory. The results of the study include, firstly, models of reflexive games in the oligopoly market, taking into account the diversity of agents’ ideas about the environment policies; secondly, the establishment of balance mechanisms in case of the coincidence or opposition of agents’ reflexive ideas about the same rank reflection. The significance of the results is justified by the fact that in terms of low ranks reflection, the reflexive behavior of agents can significantly increase market niches and profit, and in high ranks reflection such behavior does not lead to significant advantages in comparison with the absence of reflection.
Keywords: oligopoly, Stackelberg leader, reflective game, Nash equilibrium.
Mikhail I. Geras`kin, Doctor of Economics, Professor, Head of Mathematical Methods in Economics Department, Samara National Research University.